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1. Introduction 
The literature on multinational enterprises (MNEs) has extensively investigated 
the role of market size, trade barriers, and wage costs in explaining the location of 
overseas production by multinationals (Markusen, 2002). When MNEs conduct 
market-seeking foreign direct investment (FDI), the host market size and trade costs are 
crucial determinants. When MNEs engage in efficiency-seeking FDI, labor costs 
determine their plant location. The former is often called horizontal FDI (HFDI), and 
the latter vertical FDI (VFDI). As compared to HFDI and VFDI, recent research has 
increasingly focused on “export platform FDI” in which MNEs export to third markets 
from offshore production. In this type of FDI, host countries’ labor costs and their trade 
costs with third markets play a central role. 
This branch of research is motivated by the growing importance of platform-FDI 
activity. For instance, export sales accounted for over 40% of total sales by foreign 
affiliates of Japanese MNEs in 2009, and export sales to third markets represented over 
30% of the export sales (The 2010 Survey of Trends in Business Activities of Foreign 
Affiliates by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry).1 Despite its empirical 
importance, there have been few studies on export platform FDI. Eckholm et al. (2007) 
consider three types of export platform FDI according to the destination market of the 
overseas plant. “Home-country export platform” refers to the MNEs’ activity in which 
their foreign plant exports to the home market; “third-country export platform” refers to 
a foreign plant that exports only to a third market; and “global export platform” refers to 
a foreign plant exporting to both home and third markets. Other previous studies have 
examined these FDI types.2 
This paper extends the literature by decomposing the traditional platform FDI into 
pure platform FDI (PFDI) and complex platform FDI (CFDI) and explicitly analyzing 
the role of firm heterogeneity in these FDI choices. These FDI types are similar in terms 
of supplying products only to a third market, and can be called third-country platform 
FDI. MNEs engage in PFDI by locating their plants in one host country and conducting 
all stages of production there. On the other hand, MNEs pursue CFDI by maintaining 
                                                  
1 A similar share of exports to third countries can be observed also in the case of the U.S. 
multinational firms (Eckholm et al., 2007). 
2 For instance, the global platform is equivalent to the export platform in Baltagi et al. (2007), (S, S) 
production in Grossman et al. (2006), and (HSS) production in Aw and Lee (2007). The export 
platform in Blonigen et al. (2007) and (H, HS) production in Grossman et al. (2006) are included in 
the third-country platform. Lastly, the home platform can be taken as the union of vertical FDI and 
horizontal FDI. The framework in Yeaple (2003) is different from that in these studies because he 
considers the case in which overseas plants produce intermediate goods and supply them globally. 
The export platform in Mrazova and Neary (2011) is to set up one overseas plant and to supply its 
products to not only that host country but also neighboring third countries. 
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their plants in two host countries and engaging in vertical division of labor in terms of 
production process between those two plants by splitting production stages. 
Our definition of PFDI is equivalent to the third-country platform proposed in 
Eckholm et al. (2007), whereas the mechanics of CFDI have not been examined in the 
literature. Furthermore, CFDI is not only a conceptually possible type of FDI activity, 
but empirically relevant. For instance, Japanese affiliates in Mexico tend to export their 
products mainly to third markets, perhaps the U.S. Also, Japanese affiliates in the U.S. 
have increased their third-market sales from 8% in 1995 to 18% in 2006.3 If their main 
market destination is Mexico, this trend is consistent with the conceptual definition of 
CFDI. Possibly, Japanese affiliates in the U.S. may export intermediate inputs to other 
affiliates in Mexico for final assembly, and import the final products back to the U.S. 
market. 
     Our theoretical investigation provides several implications for the role of 
firm-level productivity in explaining the choice of different FDI types, including HFDI 
in which firms serve only one host market via local production. Specifically, the order 
of firms’ productivity among FDI types changes between high and low trade costs. In 
the case of low trade costs between two potential host countries, CFDI firms should 
have higher productivity than HFDI and PFDI firms in order to cover the large fixed 
entry costs of setting up multiple offshore plants. In the case of high trade costs, the 
most highly productive firms are likely to choose HFDI.  
     We empirically examine these predictions about third-country platform FDI by 
focusing on Japanese FDI in the U.S. and Mexico. These two countries have some 
country characteristics consistent with the condition in which third-country platform 
FDI from Japan could occur. As such, we define PFDI as the FDI type in which 
Japanese firms have affiliates in Mexico, but not in the U.S. If they maintain affiliates 
only in the U.S., such FDI is defined as HFDI. Additionally, CFDI refers to the FDI 
when Japanese firms have affiliates in both Mexico and the U.S. In order to investigate 
the role of trade costs between two host countries, we take the signing of the North 
American FTA (NAFTA) as a chance for drastic reductions in trade costs. Specifically, 
we provide some evidence for the prediction by separately examining the productivity 
order among FDI types before and after the signing of NAFTA. 
     Our paper differs from a vast number of studies on firm heterogeneity in 
identification strategy for self-selection effects on FDI. Since the latter half of the 1990s, 
self-selection mechanics in firms’ international activities have received enthusiastic 
                                                  
3 These numbers are calculated using the RIETI FDI Database 2010:  
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/FDI2010/index.html. 
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attention in the field of international economics. Melitz (2003) is the theoretical 
pioneering study on the selection mechanism in firms’ exporting, and theoretically 
demonstrates that exporting firms should have relatively high productivity. The Melitz 
model has also been applied to firms’ outward investing by Helpman et al. (2004), 
showing higher productivity of multinational firms over exporting firms. This 
proposition, i.e., the selection of investing, has been empirically tested by several papers 
(see, for example, Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). For identification, previous studies 
restrict the sample to domestic firms and firms that invest abroad for the first time. 
Self-selection effects are attributed to productivity differences between domestic firms 
and investing firms before making FDI. Such analysis isolates learning-by-investing 
effects from ex-ante productivity inherent to the firm, making it possible to focus on the 
impact of firms’ inherent efficiency on investment decisions. 
     However, the causal analysis of self-selection mechanics in third-country 
platform FDI, particularly CFDI, is more difficult than in other types of FDI examined 
previously. While most of the prior work examines the self-selection effects for 
single-plant FDI, we need to analyze FDI activity associated with multiple offshore 
plants. The difficulty is that CFDI firms maintain two overseas affiliates, which are 
usually not set up at the same time. Thus, firm-level productivity would contain the 
learning effects from the first foreign plant if we compare its productivity after setting 
up the first affiliate and before setting up the second affiliate. To isolate the learning 
effects, we examine those Japanese firms that have no affiliate or only an affiliate in the 
U.S. in a given year, but maintain affiliates in both the U.S. and Mexico for a 
sufficiently late year. Comparing these Japanese firms with the firms that invest only in 
the U.S., we attribute their productivity differences to self-selection effects on CFDI. To 
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to explore the role of firms’ 
productivity in third-country platform FDI and to analyze self-selection effects for a 
multi-plant type of FDI.4 
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 theoretically 
demonstrates firms’ choice of FDI type. Section 3 explains data sources and describes 
the characteristics of Japanese FDI according to different FDI types. Section 4 conducts 
an econometric analysis of theoretical implications on the order of firm productivity 
among FDI types. We draw some conclusions in section 5. 
 
                                                  
4 Aw and Lee (2008) and Yeaple (2009) examine the role of productivity in a multi-plant type of 
FDI. However, those papers compared firms’ FDI status in a given year with their productivity in 
that year, namely a simple correlation analysis. Thus, investors’ productivity contains the learning 
effects through investing abroad. 
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2. Theoretical Analysis 
This section examines the condition in which heterogeneous firms determine 
complex integration strategies for HFDI, PFDI, and CFDI. It should be noted that the 
aim of this section is not to provide a general equilibrium model of multi-production 
stages and multi-country operations, but simply to obtain insights into the driving forces 
behind firms’ choices of FDI patterns in a partial equilibrium model. 
 
2.1. Profit Functions in Each Strategy 
Suppose that there are three countries: home country and two potential host 
countries. The host countries are called “North” and “South”. We assume that finished 
products are horizontally differentiated, for which each of a continuum of firms 
manufactures a different brand. For simplicity, the finished products are assumed to be 
consumed only in North.5 A representative consumer in North has a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function over varieties. As is well known, under the CES utility 
function, demand for the variety k in country i is derived as: xi (k) = pi (k)-σ A, where σ is 
the elasticity of substitution between varieties with σ > 1. pi (k) is the price of the 
variety k produced in country i. The brand name k is omitted hereafter for brevity. A ≡ 
Pσ-1Y, where P is the price index and Y is total income in North. Although the demand 
level A is endogenous to the industry, it is treated as exogenous by producers because 
every producer is of negligible size relative to the industry size. There are iceberg trade 
costs ti (≥1) for the shipment of finished products from country i: ti = 1 if country i is 
North and ti = t if country i is South. As mentioned later, since the products are supplied 
by firms in either North or South, not the home country, trade costs are either unity or t. 
The market structure of the finished product sector can be regarded as 
monopolistic competition. Finished products are produced in two stages of production. 
The production function in each stage is kept as simple as possible in order to highlight 
the interdependence of different production stages. Our Leontief-type production 
structure is as follows: a first-stage product is produced using θ units of skilled labor; a 
second-stage product is produced using one unit of the first-stage product and θ units of 
unskilled labor.6 In other words, our production structure implies that products of each 
stage are used in fixed proportions, as there is no substitutability between both stages of 
                                                  
5 As mentioned later, the assumption of costly trade costs in both intermediate and finished goods 
makes the analysis quite complicated. Thus, as in Grossman et al. (2006), we assume no demand in 
South. Nevertheless, our results do not change even if finished products can be consumed also in the 
home country. 
6 Assuming different input coefficients of production factors between products does not change our 
results qualitatively. For instance, if it is assumed that more than θ units of unskilled labor are 
necessary to produce a second-stage product, its production is more likely to be conducted in South. 
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products. Furthermore, an improvement in cost efficiency decreases the production 
factors used to produce each stage of product in the same proportion. 
Factor prices for skilled and unskilled labor are represented by r and w, 
respectively. Once again, there are iceberg trade costs t for the shipment of the 
first-stage product between North and South. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed 
that trade costs are identical between the first- and second-stage products.7 If firms 
produce either or both the first- and second-stage products in North (South), they must 
incur plant set-up costs fN (fS). For example, when firms produce the first-stage product 
in North and the second-stage product in South, they need to pay fN + fS. 
By assuming that wN ≥ wS and rS ≥ rN, we consider the production pattern of firms 
with headquarters at home. It is assumed that the headquarters cannot be relocated. In 
this paper, we are interested in three specific patterns8: HFDI (H), PFDI (P), and CFDI 
(C). HFDI is the production pattern in which firms produce the first- and second-stage 
products in North and supply finished products (i.e. the second-stage products) 
domestically. In PFDI, firms produce both stages of products in South and supply 
finished products from South to North. Lastly, CFDI is the pattern in which firms 
produce the first-stage product in North and the second-stage product in South, and 
supply finished products from South to North. We can rule out another complex type of 
platform FDI in which firms produce the first-stage product in South and the 
second-stage product in North because it is less profitable than HFDI due to the 
assumptions on relative factor prices.9 
Among the three patterns, firms choose the pattern which yields the highest total 
profit. Let cM be a marginal cost in the production pattern M (H, P, or C). Then 
respective marginal costs are given by: 
                                                  
7 Distinguishing trade costs between two stages makes the analysis quite complicated, and the 
examination of such a model is beyond the purpose of our empirical analysis; for such a model, see 
Grossman et al. (2006). However, it is worth noting that their model does not yield our PFDI and 
CFDI due to their assumption of identical trade costs among country-pairs. In this paper, we assume 
different trade costs between the Home-North pair and the South-North pair, which make these FDI 
types more profitable. 
8 Strictly speaking, we need to impose more assumptions to rule out other possible production 
patterns. Additional assumptions are that North has the same factor prices as home, and that fixed 
costs fN and fS are low enough, compared with iceberg trade costs between Home and North. These 
assumptions rule out the possibilities that firms supply their first/second products produced at home 
to North/South. The exclusion is due to our focus on firms’ choice among only FDI types, not 
including exporting from home. Furthermore, even if we assume that the finished products produced 
in North/South can be consumed also at home, firms produce those products for the home market in 
the home country under these assumptions. 
9 This type of complex platform FDI can be most profitable if we change the order of factor prices 
between North and South to the opposite order and the production factor used in each stage of 
product. 
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cH = (rNθ + wNθ),   cP = (rSθ + wSθ) t,   cC = (trNθ + wSθ) t. 
The profit-maximizing strategy yields pi = σciM/(σ−1), so profit functions are 
represented by: 
πH = (rN + wN)1- A Θ – fN,  
πP = (rS + wS)1-σA t1-σ Θ – fS,  
πC = (trN + wS)1-σA t1-σ Θ – fN – fS, 
where Θ ≡ (1-σ) σ-1 σ-σ θ1-σ. We call Θ the productivity measure. Since σ > 1, the smaller 
cost efficiency θ implies a larger value of productivity measure Θ. 
 
2.2. FDI Choice 
     This subsection examines which production pattern the firms at home choose 
according to their productivity levels. Let SM be the slope of the profit function in 
production type M. Then the three slopes are represented by: 
SH = (rN + wN)1-σ A,  SP = (rS + wS)1-σ A t1-σ,  SC = (trN + wS)1-σA t1-σ. 
Immediately, we can obtain the following corollaries: 
 
Corollary 1. SH ≥ SP iff t ≥ (rN + wN)/(rS + wS). 
 
Corollary 2. SC ≥ SP iff t ≤ rS/rN. 
 
Corollary 3. SC ≥ SH iff t (trN + wS) ≤ (rN + wN). 
 
These corollaries can be further summarized as follows: 
 
Corollary 4. Suppose that (rN + wN)/(rS + wS) > rS/rN. Then, SH > SP > SC iff t > (rN + 
wN)/(rS + wS), and SC > SP > SH iff t < rS/rN. SP ≥ SC and SP ≥ SH iff rS/rN ≤ t ≤ (rN + 
wN)/(rS + wS). 
 
Corollary 5. Suppose that (rN + wN)/(rS + wS) < rS/rN. Then, SH > SP > SC iff t > rS/rN, 
and SC > SP > SH iff t < (rN + wN)/(rS + wS). SP ≥ SC and SP ≥ SH iff rS/rN ≤ t ≤ (rN + 
wN)/(rS + wS). 
 
To illustrate a profit line for each FDI type with the profit level on the vertical 
axis against productivity, we need to know the orders of the slopes among FDI types 
and fixed costs between North and South. Based on the above discussion, the order of 
the slopes can be summarized as follows. As is clear from Corollaries 4 and 5, the 
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medium range of trade costs suggests that the slope of PFDI is always the highest, but it 
is ambiguous whether or not the slope for HFDI is steeper than that for CFDI. In the 
high range of trade costs, we have an ordering of SH > SP > SC whereas the ordering is 
SC > SP > SH in the low range of trade costs. To simplify our analysis, we focus on the 
high and low ranges of trade costs hereafter. However, we do not know the order of 
fixed costs. For example, from an empirical point of view, it remains unknown whether 
Japanese firms have lower fixed costs for local production in the U.S. or Mexico. Thus, 
we consider both the cases of fN > fS and fS > fN. 
Before showing the figures of profit lines, it is worth pointing out three crucial 
determinants of FDI type: differentials in factor price, trade cost, and fixed cost between 
North and South. First, wage differentials for skilled and unskilled labor between North 
and South increase the benefit from vertical division of labor by production stage, 
which encourages firms to choose CFDI. Second, the large trade costs between North 
and South discourage the CFDI type because firms incur trade costs twice, i.e. those for 
transporting the first-stage product from North to South and those for transporting the 
second-stage product from South to North. Since firms choosing PFDI pay trade costs 
for shipping the second-stage product from South to North, the choice of PFDI is also 
discouraged in the case of high trade costs. Lastly, the lower fixed costs in North and 
South encourage firms to choose HFDI and PFDI. 
Taking factor prices as given, we can depict four kinds of figures according to 
trade costs between North and South and the order of fixed costs between them.10 As 
shown in Figure 1, in the case of low trade costs and lower fixed costs in North, firms in 
the medium range of productivity choose PFDI, and those in the high range of 
productivity choose CFDI. The reason is that low trade costs encourage firms to choose 
CFDI. However, CFDI needs the highest fixed costs, which deter less productive firms 
from choosing it. Since the low trade costs also decrease the burden of trade costs in 
PFDI that has smaller fixed costs than CFDI, less productive firms tend to choose PFDI. 
However, PFDI also needs relatively higher fixed costs than HFDI because of the lower 
fixed costs in North, so firms in the low range of productivity will choose HFDI. 
 
===   Figure 1   === 
 
As shown in Figure 2, in the case of low trade costs and lower fixed costs in 
                                                  
10 We assume that profit lines interact at a positive level of profits. In any of the figures, firms with 
the lowest range of productivity do not locate their affiliates overseas, and do not supply their 
products through exporting from home. Also see footnote 8.  
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South, firms with relatively high productivity are able to choose CFDI while those with 
relatively low productivity choose PFDI. The underlying logic in this case is basically 
the same as previously mentioned. On the other hand, PFDI requires lower fixed costs 
than HFDI, so all firms that are not able to choose CFDI will pick PFDI. As a result, no 
firm will choose HFDI. 
 
===   Figure 2   === 
 
The cases of high trade costs are explained as follows. Figure 3 shows that in the 
case of lower fixed costs in North, all firms choose HFDI for the expensive operation in 
South due to the high trade costs and the higher fixed costs in South. In the case of 
lower fixed costs in South as shown in Figure 4, high-productivity firms follow HFDI 
whereas low-productivity firms choose PFDI. HFDI is chosen by productive firms that 
can earn sufficient profits to cover the relatively high fixed costs in North. Since high 
trade costs prevent firms from choosing CFDI, the relatively less productive firms 
follow PFDI. In sum, high trade costs encourage firms to choose HFDI. 
 
===   Figures 3&4   === 
 
As a result, our simple theoretical examination gives us the following testable 
hypotheses, which will be subject to empirical investigations11: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Assume that wages for skilled and unskilled labor are lower in North and 
South, respectively. When trade costs between North and South are low enough, 
low-productivity firms choose HFDI. Medium-productivity firms follow PFDI, and 
high-productivity firms pick CFDI. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Assume that wages for skilled and unskilled labor are lower in North and 
South, respectively. When trade costs between North and South are high enough, 
high-productivity firms pursue HFDI while low-productivity firms choose PFDI. 
 
 
                                                  
11 Although we assume that firms need to pay fN and fS in choosing CFDI, total fixed costs in the 
case of CFDI may be less than fN + fS. Nevertheless, it seems to be natural that such total fixed costs 
are at least greater than fN or fS. In this case, even if we assume that total fixed costs in CFDI are less 
than fN + fS, our results above do not change qualitatively at all; rather, it expands the productivity 
range of firms choosing CFDI. 
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3. Data Description 
     This section provides an overview of outward FDI activity in Japan, using the 
data on overseas affiliates of Japanese companies from Toyo Keizai’s Overseas 
Japanese Companies Data. This dataset has been widely used in the literature, 
including Head and Ries (2002) and Cieślik and Ryan (2009). The Toyo Keizai 
conducts an annual survey on around 6,000 Japanese business enterprises that are either 
listed or not listed on the stock market and maintain at least one foreign subsidiary. 
Information on the overseas affiliates includes their location, investment year, 
investment type (new establishment, capital investment, and acquisition), amount of 
capital, total number of employees, number of employees, earnings, main lines of 
business, purpose of investment, and funding relationship with their parent firm(s). The 
overseas affiliates in the sample are defined as those in which a Japanese firm has 
invested capital of 10% or more. 
     In order to focus our analysis only on the FDI types considered in the theoretical 
section, we restrict the sample to overseas affiliates in the U.S. and Mexico. Specifically, 
we define the firms choosing HFDI as those that have affiliate production not in Mexico, 
but in the U.S. The firms for PFDI are those that have affiliate production not in the 
U.S., but in Mexico. Lastly, the firms for CFDI are those that have affiliate production 
in both the U.S. and Mexico. 
     These two countries meet at least three assumptions on host-country 
characteristics imposed in the previous section. First, we assume wN ≥ wS and rS ≥ rN. 
We should interpret this assumption under the condition that labor quality is similar in 
the U.S. and Mexico. If a firm in Mexico employs skilled labor with the same education 
level as that in the U.S., they will incur higher costs for searching for qualified workers 
in Mexico due to a lack of skilled labor. This suggests that the total cost per skilled 
labor in Mexico is likely to be more expensive than that in the U.S. Second, we assume 
that Home and North have the same factor prices. In our sample, Japan is the home 
country for the firms with affiliate production in the U.S., suggesting that the second 
assumption is reasonable when Japan and the U.S. have almost the same level of factor 
prices. Lastly, we assume that fN and fS are low enough as compared with trade costs 
between Home and North. This assumption is sensible because the U.S. and Mexico are 
geographically distant from Japan, as compared with, for example, East Asian countries. 
     We examine the hypothesis by comparing the orders of parent-firm productivity 
among FDI types before and after a decline in trade costs between North and South. To 
this end, we take the signing of NAFTA in 1993 as the cutoff period for which trade 
costs between the U.S. and Mexico started to decrease substantially. Calculating 
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ad-valorem trade costs from the U.S. import data by Feenstra (1996), we find that trade 
costs including both duties and freight rate were 6.09 percent on average across the 
manufacturing industry in 1990, with a standard deviation of 4.35. In 2000, the average 
trade costs declined to 2.43 percent with a standard deviation of 2.02.12 
     While declines in ad-valorem trade costs vary substantially by industry, trade 
costs between the U.S. and Mexico decreased significantly between 1990 and 2000. 
Motivated by these facts, we interpret our hypothesis as suggesting that firm 
productivity should be the highest for the HFDI type in 1990 and for the CFDI type in 
2000. This suggests that productivity is the highest for the Japanese firms that had 
foreign affiliate(s) only in the U.S. in 1990, while it is the largest for the Japanese firms 
that had foreign affiliates in both the U.S. and Mexico in 2000. 
Table 1 tabulates the number of all firms classified by each FDI type, together 
with the number of firms that are listed on Japanese stock markets. The table shows that 
there are few PFDI firms for both all and listed firms. In the case of listed firms, there 
were only two firms classified as PFDI in 1990, and there were no firms in 2000. From 
a theoretical point of view, the small number of PFDI firms would point to the 
extremely small productivity range in which PFDI firms have the highest profits, 
meaning that wages for skilled workers in the U.S. are much lower than those in Mexico. 
Indeed, the U.S. is endowed more abundantly with skilled labor than Mexico. Therefore, 
PFDI is less likely to yield the highest profit for Japanese FDI in this region. 
Another interesting observation is that the number of CFDI firms remarkably 
increased from 1990 to 2000, as compared with HFDI and PFDI firms. This could 
reflect the fact that the signing of NAFTA resulted in a significant change in trade costs 
between the U.S. and Mexico. As illustrated previously, an increase in CFDI firms is 
more pronounced than that in PFDI firms because CFDI requires firms to pay trade 
costs twice, but PFDI firms pay only once. Thus, the drastic reduction of trade costs 
between those two countries significantly increased the firms’ profits in the case of 
CFDI, encouraging domestic, HFDI, and PFDI firms to conduct CFDI. These 
mechanisms could partly account for the fact that the number of CFDI firms tripled 
from 41 in 1990 to 112 in 2000. 
 
                                                  
12 Following Bernard et al. (2006), we measure ad-valorem trade costs at the industry level from 
product-level U.S. import data compiled by Feenstra (1996). As imported products are classified 
according to the Harmonized System (HS) at the 10 digit level since 1989, we make a concordance 
between the HS code and industry classification of Japanese-owned foreign affiliates. For industry i 
and time t, we define ad-valorem trade costs as the sum of tariff and freight costs over customs 
import value: where fob is the free-on-board value and cif is the cost + insurance + freight value. 
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===   Table 1   === 
 
Next, we compare firms’ productivity by FDI type. This paper estimates total 
factor productivity (TFP) for parent firms to measure their productivity. One sensitive 
issue for the TFP estimates derived from production function estimation is how to deal 
with unobserved productivity shocks. If they are correlated with unobservable input 
variables, simple OLS estimates will be biased. To address this endogeneity issue, we 
apply the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This method uses 
intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobservable productivity shocks and obtains a 
consistent estimator of TFP. To this end, we use the data on firms’ real gross output, 
real capital stock, and labor inputs from the database of “East Asian Listed Companies 
(EALC)” provided by Fukao et al. (2009)13. Because we use this database, our sample 
for productivity comparison is restricted to listed firms. 
Table 1 reports the average and standard deviation of firms’ TFP by FDI type. As 
confirmed above, the number of PFDI firms is too small to compare their productivity 
with the productivity for other types of firms. By restricting to the average TFP for 
HFDI and CFDI firms, we can see that CFDI firms have on average a higher TFP than 
HFDI firms do in both 1990 and 2000. However, the result in 1990 is not necessarily 
consistent with our theoretical prediction that HFDI firms should have the highest 
productivity before the reduction of trade costs, possibly due to omitted determinants of 
productivity. To address this issue, we conduct an econometric analysis in the next 
section. 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
This section presents a formal econometric analysis for a comparison of firms’ 
TFP across FDI types. Then, we proceed to identify a self-selection effect of firm 
productivity on the FDI types. 
 
4.1. Conditional Productivity Comparisons 
     In this analysis, we restrict the sample to the Japanese firms categorized as HFDI, 
PFDI, or CFDI firms. The small number of PFDI firms forces us to combine PFDI and 
CFDI firms, which can serve as a benchmark set of firms for productivity comparison. 
Our estimating equation is specified as follows: 
                                                  
13  The data is available at the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) web 
site: http://www.jcer.or.jp/report/asia/detail3735.html#database. Details of the measurement 
methodology and results are provided in Fukao et al. (2009). 
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ln TFPi = β0 + β1 HFDIi + β2 ln (1 + Foreign Experience Yearsi) + us + εi. 
TFPi is firm i’s TFP, and HFDIi takes unity if firm i has affiliates in the U.S. but not in 
Mexico. The positive sign of β1 implies that measured productivity is on average higher 
for HFDI firms than PFDI and CFDI firms. Additionally, we control for differences in 
knowledge/experience in international activities across firms by including the number 
of years from each firm’s first FDI in any region. We expect that longer experience in 
foreign business is positively associated with firm productivity. Foreign Experience 
Years are the sample year minus the entry year of the parent firm’s first foreign affiliate, 
calculated using Toyo Keizai’s “Overseas Japanese Companies Data”. Finally, we 
control for unobserved time-invariant differences in firm productivity across industry by 
including industry fixed effects, us. 
Table 2 reports the OLS estimation of the above equation for years 1990 and 
2000 separately. Our central hypothesis is that relatively more productive firms would 
choose HFDI during the period with high trade costs between the U.S. and Mexico 
whereas relatively less productive firms would pursue HFDI during the period with low 
trade costs between these countries. The expected coefficients for the HFDI dummy 
variable are positive in 1990 and negative in 2000. The results show that the HFDI 
dummy has significantly negative coefficients in both years, supporting the prediction 
in the year 2000. According to our estimates, third-country platform firms had 0.4% and 
0.7% higher productivity than HFDI firms in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Thus, our 
analysis provides some evidence consistent with theoretical predictions on the order of 
firm productivity across FDI types when trade costs are relatively low. Finally, the years 
of overseas experience have significantly positive coefficients in both years. This result 
indicates that higher TFP may be necessary to have longer experience, or that longer 
experience may raise firms’ TFP. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
As in Table 1, HFDI firms did not have the highest productivity in 1990, i.e. a 
period of high trade costs, even in the comparison of firms’ productivity conditional on 
firm and industry characteristics. However, these results must be interpreted with 
caution for at least two reasons. First, the regression analysis does not show any causal 
relationship between firms’ productivity and their choice of FDI type. Because 
productivity comparisons are made from a cross-sectional point of view, the 
self-selection effects of firm productivity on FDI choice are not strictly disentangled 
from learning-by-investing effects. Our estimates for the relative productivity of HFDI 
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firms could reflect both of these effects. Second, our empirical assumption for higher 
trade costs in 1990 may not be strictly consistent with the theoretical setting. High trade 
costs are an important condition in which more productive firms choose HFDI. 
Although we show a decline in ad-valorem trade costs between the U.S. and Mexico 
between 1990 and 2000, it is possible to interpret that the trade costs were already low 
for the year 1990. Unfortunately, the lack of data does not allow us to examine the older 
period when trade costs should have been much larger.  
 
4.2. Identification of Self-selection Effects 
     This section explores the selection effects of investing, i.e. order of firms’ 
inherent productivity in investment decisions. Up to this point, our measure of 
productivity in the previous analysis contained both firms’ inherent productivity and 
learning-by-investing effects. However, the productivity measure in the theoretical 
setting does not take into account learning effects on productivity, so we need to 
disentangle firm-level inherent productivity from such effects. In the case of traditional 
FDI types, the previous papers often use firms’ productivity one or a few years before 
their timing of making investments. However, such a comparison may not be applicable 
to our case because CFDI firms do not necessarily locate their two production plants 
simultaneously, i.e. in the same year. CFDI firms may locate their second plant several 
years after locating their first plant. In this case, the use of firms’ productivity a few 
years before setting up the second plant contains the learning-by-investing effects from 
the setup of the first plant. In short, it is not easy to examine exclusively firms’ inherent 
productivity level in the case of FDI with multiple foreign affiliates. 
     Our identification strategy for selection effects is as follows. We focus on a 
productivity comparison between HFDI and CFDI. Let (X, Y) be firms who are 
categorized into FDI type, X, in period t−1 and Y in period t. The time interval between 
these two periods is made long enough. Then, we compare productivity in the period 
t−1 between firms categorized into (None, HFDI) and (None, CFDI). In this 
comparison, the productivity in the period t−1 does not contain the 
learning-by-investing effects because in that period the sample firms do not have any 
affiliate in either the U.S. or Mexico. Specifically, we set t−1 at year 1985 for the 
analysis. In order to compare differences in the productivity order between high and low 
trade costs, we set t as the period 1985–1992 for high trade costs and as the period 
1994−2006 for low trade costs. For example, if firms that have no affiliate in the U.S. 
and Mexico for 1985 invest in both countries during the period of 1985–1992, these 
firms are categorized into (None, CFDI). For the analysis of high trade costs, we 
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compare these firms’ productivity in 1985 with the productivity of firms that invest only 
in the U.S. during the period of 1985–1992. 
     Based on this strategy, we estimate the probit model in which a dependent 
variable takes unity if firms are categorized into (None, CFDI) and zero if they are 
categorized into (None, HFDI). The independent variables are firms’ TFP in 1985 and 
the Foreign Experience Years. The results in Table 3 show that there are no significant 
coefficients in both TFP and Foreign Experience Years. In particular, the sample size is 
very small in the case of high trade costs. The reason is that there are no firms 
categorized into (None, CFDI) in some industries, for which observations are dropped 
due to the perfect prediction by industry dummy variables. However, even with a 
relatively large number of observations in the case of low trade costs, the coefficient for 
TFP is still insignificant. Also, the results for the Foreign Experience Years indicate that 
longer experience in overseas activities does not have a significant impact on firms’ 
choice between HFDI and CFDI. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
     We also make another comparison between (HFDI, HFDI) and (HFDI, CFDI). 
HFDI might be the optimal choice for firms in the case of high trade costs between the 
U.S. and Mexico. However, if the trade costs are significantly reduced, CFDI turns out 
to be a better choice particularly for the HFDI firms with high productivity. Especially, 
we assume that the learning-by-investing effects are not heterogeneous in firms’ ex-ante 
productivity. That is, the productivity improvement effects through setting up the first 
plant in the U.S. (i.e., HFDI) have the same magnitude among HFDI firms. This 
assumption implies that the difference in HFDI firms’ productivity in the initial period, 
i.e. year 1985, does not include the differences in learning-by-investing effects of HFDI, 
but is due solely to their inherent productivity differentials. Under this assumption, the 
productivity comparison between (HFDI, HFDI) and (HFDI, CFDI) also enables us to 
explore the causal relationship between firms’ productivity and their choice of FDI type. 
The results of probit estimation are provided in Table 4. As compared with the 
case of Table 3, this comparison gives us a sufficient number of sample observations. 
The results show that Foreign Experience Years have significantly positive coefficients, 
suggesting that longer experience in overseas activities encourages firms to change their 
FDI type from HFDI to CFDI. Additionally, the expected contrast between two 
equations can be seen from the TFP levels. In a period of high trade costs, all HFDI 
firms including productive HFDI firms stay in the status of HFDI. However, in a period 
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of low trade costs, the productive HFDI firms change their FDI status to CFDI. This 
result is consistent with our expectation based on the theoretical analysis in Section 2. 
Thus, the more productive firms are more likely to conduct CFDI than HFDI. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigated theoretically and empirically firms’ productivity ranking 
among HFDI, PFDI, and CFDI. Our theoretical illustration shows that CFDI firms have 
highest productivity when trade costs between host and sales-destination markets are 
low. In the empirical analysis, HFDI and PFDI are defined as investment in either the 
U.S. or Mexico, respectively. The CFDI firms are defined as those that have production 
affiliates in both the U.S. and Mexico. Since few firms are categorized into PFDI in the 
case of Japanese FDI, our analysis on self-selection focuses on the productivity 
comparison between CFDI and HFDI. Based on an econometric analysis, we found that 
our hypothesis is consistent with the estimation results for a period of low trade costs, 
whereas the results for a period of high trade costs do not show the highest productivity 
of CFDI firms. 
Our results yield a policy implication for low-wage countries seeking to attract 
foreign investment. It has been believed that one of the most important policies for 
attracting foreign investment is to reduce the trade costs with potential investing 
countries. However, we show that the reduction of trade costs with those neighboring 
large market countries matters for the investment decision by firms. MNEs with 
relatively high productivity may locate their production plants in low-wage countries by 
relocating some production stages from the sales market. In sum, our results indicate 
that it is important for low-wage countries to reduce the trade costs with not only 
investing countries but also neighboring large market countries, in order to attract 
MNEs, particularly those with high productivity. 
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Table 1. A Comparison of Productivity between Horizontal and Platform FDI Firms 
 
HFDI HFDI
PFDI CFDI PFDI CFDI
Number of All Firms 1,593 11 73 2,012 18 215
Number of Listed Firms 469 2 41 628 1 112
   Ave. TFP 8.54 9.37 8.98 9.03 8.69 9.77
   S.D. 1.32 0.33 1.28 1.36 n.a. 1.53
Platform FDI Platform FDI
1990 2000
 
 
Note: TFP is estimated by the Levinsohn-Petrin estimation approach with Grid search. 
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Table 2. Regression Results of Productivity Differences: HFDI versus PFDI/CFDI 
 
1990 2000
HFDI -0.416** -0.713**
(0.189) (0.127)
Log of Foreign Experience Years 0.349*** 0.391**
(0.059) (0.092)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Number of Observations 509 713
R-squared 0.43 0.21  
 
Notes: The dependent variables are firms’ TFP, which is estimated by the Levinsohn-Petrin estimation approach with Grid search. Figures in parentheses 
are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
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Table 3. Probit on Self-selection: No FDI before 1986 (Marginal Effect) 
 
 
(I) (II)
Dependent variable No FDI before 1986 No FDI before 1986
(= 0 if HFDI, = 1 if CFDI) HFDI or CFDI for 1989-1992 HFDI or CFDI after 1994
LP TFP in 1985 0.0001 0.003
(0.004) (0.012)
Log of Foreign Experience Years 0.012 0.003
(0.028) (0.022)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Number of Observations 52 173
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 0.08
 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. The sample firms are restricted 
to those who did not have any affiliates in both the U.S. and Mexico before 1986. 
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Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. The sample firms are restricted 
to those who invested in the U.S. but not in Mexico before 1986. 
 
(I) (II)
Dependent variable HFDI before 1986 HFDI before 1986
(= 0 if HFDI, = 1 if CFDI) HFDI or CFDI for 1989-1992 HFDI or CFDI after 1994
LP TFP in 1985 0.003 0.040**
(0.004) (0.018)
Log of Foreign Experience Years 0.012** 0.069**
(0.006) (0.034)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Number of Observations 264 317
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09
Table 4. Probit on Self-selection: HFDI before 1986 (Marginal Effect) 
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Figure 2. Profit Lines: Low Trade Costs and Lower Fixed Costs in South 
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Figure 3. Profit Lines: High Trade Costs and Lower Fixed Costs in North 
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Figure 4. Profit Lines: High Trade Costs and Lower Fixed Costs in South 
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